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4. Moral reasoning in economics* 
Jonathan B. Wight 
The Teagle discussion analyzes why economics teachers have become 
overly narrow in their pedagogical perspectives, thus pulling back from 
fully supporting the liberal arts agenda. In Chapter 1, Colander and 
McGoldrick (p. 6) observe that the generalist approach that excites stu-
dents by asking "big think" questions across disciplinary boundaries fails 
to generate new knowledge, while the narrow "little think" questions that 
can be answered often fail to develop the critical thinking skills necessary 
for liberal education. As one example, the authors cite the decline of moral 
reasoning in economics, which was once center stage in Adam Smith's 
analysis of society. Since the rise of positivism in the late nineteenth 
century, moral reasoning has become an intellectual casualty. 
Virtually all major public policy problems cross disciplinary bounda-
ries however, and raise substantial normative questions. If a key goal of 
the liberal arts is to prepare students to make reasoned judgments about 
complex issues, economics educators cannot sit on the sidelines and expect 
that this will happen magically. Teachers play an important role in defining 
the questions and discerning the methods for arriving at answers. A liberal 
arts focus in economics would ensure that students grapple with ethical 
dilemmas informed by a variety of approaches and competing ethical 
frameworks. Moral discourse is an important way for students to scrutinize 
their own unstated beliefs and to develop a deeper appreciation for the 
benefits (and the limitations) of economic theory. Without it, we may be 
training technocrats skilled in techniques but not prepared to be business or 
community leaders- who will certainly have to navigate moral minefields. 
The contribution of this discussion is to point out that a liberal edu-
cation requires critical thinking skills that are only partially addressed 
by traditional methods in economics. What it means to "think like an 
economist" contains a hefty dose of implicit ethical judgment- which in a 
liberal arts setting should be examined and debated as a way of integrating 
economics with its sister disciplines in philosophy, political science, and 
other fields. This comment deals with two areas of potential controversy-
welfare analysis and alternative moral frameworks.' 
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WELFARE ANALYSIS IS NOT PURE SCIENCE 
If economics is a science, why should economists and their students 
know or care about ethics? The answer has three parts: first, students are 
implicitly using ethical frameworks and theories in carrying out positive 
research whether they are conscious of it or not. To progress, science 
requires shared moral norms and positive economics entails acceptance 
of these ethical ideals. Second, having students pursue the "little think" 
questions in research often involves an uncritical acceptance of the ethical 
assumptions and worldview upon which the research is built (Colander 
and McGoldrick, Chapter 1, this volume, p. 6; Kuhn, 1962). Third, many 
students (and faculty) are unaware that efficiency and Pareto optimality 
are ethical constructs. Critical thinking about cost/benefit requires going 
outside this comfort zone. This last point is the most troubling, because if 
"efficiency" is viewed simply as a "fact" instead of an evaluative concept, 
this creates intellectual blinders for students attempting to cross discipli-
nary boundaries (as we hope they would do in a liberal arts setting). I note 
below, for example, that economics students and public health students 
will likely have opposing views of what is meant by efficiency - which 
is understandable only if the concept is properly understood as part of 
normative discourse. 
Economic efficiency is often portrayed as a positive concept however, 
because "welfare" can be defined and quantitatively measured through 
consumer and producer triangles. Few principles textbooks adequately 
address the point that welfare economics was developed as a branch 
of normative economics and that its offspring of economic efficiency is 
equally an ethical proposition: it is constructed on the basis of choosing 
a worthy normative goal. As the history of thought fades from graduate 
school requirements, fewer teachers understand the evolution of welfare 
theory and the issues that arise for public policy analysis. 
Here is a quick thought experiment to bring out the normative character 
of economic efficiency. Assign students the role of doctors engaged in an 
emergency medical triage (the ranking of patients for treatment based on 
medical severity and/or survivability). Tell the student-doctors that each 
patient needs an antibiotic to survive and that there are more patients than 
doses of antibiotic available. In this short-run emergency, the supply of 
antibiotic is perfectly inelastic. Some gravely ill patients will likely die even 
if given the antibiotic. Ask the student-doctors: "How would you decide to 
allocate the scarce antibiotic?" (Answer: doctors would probably want to 
allocate serum so as to be efficient at "saving the most lives," which means 
giving doses of antibiotic to those whose survivability is most enhanced.) 
Next ask the student-doctors, "What would you do if many of the patients 
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most likely to die without antibiotics were children?" (Answer: many 
doctors would now change their allocation so as to be efficient at "saving 
the most life-years-extended," which means factoring in not only expected 
survival but expected years lived after survival.) Finally, ask the student-
doctors to consider what would happen if antibiotics were allocated not by 
triage, but rather sold to the highest bidder so as to satisfy individual con-
sumer preferences in the market. (Answer: economic efficiency is achieved, 
but probably fewer lives would be saved since triage was ignored.) 
This exercise makes clear to students that there are a multitude of 
notions of "efficiency," and each serves a different normative master. 
Economists use a particular ethical norm as their implicit "baggage" - the 
definition and choice of dominant goal ("economic welfare") - by which 
the economic system is evaluated. The economic view is most certainly 
defensible, but not on positive grounds; it relies upon a series of restric-
tive normative arguments. This economic baggage should be subject to 
scrutiny and discussion in the classroom. You would not let someone on a 
plane without checking the contents of their carry-on, and economics edu-
cation should be no different. We should unpack and examine the ethical 
framework that informs the standard economic approach. For a complete 
discussion of these issues, see Hausman and McPherson (2006). 
Textbooks set the context for much classroom discussion, and most 
textbook authors have followed the trend of preparing students for 
narrow specialization rather than liberal learning. In the most recent 
edition of Frank and Bernanke (2009), the authors illustrate some of the 
problems relating to the discussion of efficiency. First, the authors care-
fully note that "efficiency is not the only goal" of an economic system and 
that an efficient outcome is not the same thing as a "good" outcome. But 
they go on to state - as if it were a scientific fact rather than a normative 
argument - that, "efficiency should be the first goal." The authors base 
this claim on the assertion that being economically efficient "enables us 
to achieve all our other goals to the fullest possible extent" (p. 179). This 
implies that static efficiency in the short run is in fact the only "good" 
outcome because there is an alchemic process that can best turn it into any 
other desirable outcome. As we demonstrated in the triage case, however, 
this is not always possible. Achieving economic efficiency often comes at 
the expense of other measures of efficiency, such as saving the most lives 
or life-years extended. 
Even if the economic welfare approach (satisfying consumer prefer-
ences) does not save the most lives in the short run, students should 
discern that allowing patients to bid up the price of antibiotics could lead 
to more serum (and better serum) being produced in the long run. Hence, 
more lives might be saved over time by allowing competitive markets to 
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work. This is an insightful point, and students should consider the struc-
ture of it: the economic goal has suddenly shifted from static efficiency to 
dynamic efficiency. Our attention turns away from satisfying consumer 
preferences in this market, and towards satisfying preferences in some 
undefined future time period. Do future consumers have moral standing 
(for example, should their preferences count)? What is the correct time 
horizon for making this analysis? And how should we discount future lives 
gained versus the present lives lost? One distinction between classical and 
Austrian economists on the one hand, and modern neo-classical econo-
mists on the other, is the differing attention provided to dynamic versus 
static efficiency (Blaug, 2001). These are thorny ethical issues in addition 
to scientific questions, and students will confront similar problems in a 
variety of policy areas and classes. 
In summary, economics teachers can make a strong case for apprais-
ing policies on the basis of static efficiency, but this requires an evalua-
tive framework that is substantially different from classical economics 
and from other consequentialist approaches (such as classical utilitarian 
or rule-utilitarian approaches). Non-consequentialist modes of analysis 
might also be helpful in some cases (Frank, 2000). We turn briefly to this 
topic. 
ALTERNATIVE ETHICAL FRAMEWORKS 
The analysis of public policy goes deeper than simply choosing norma-
tive goals within a consequentialist framework. The reason for this is that 
sometimes process matters, and "the ends do not justify the means" as 
exemplified in Kantian and religious ethics. My experience is that many 
students adopt duty-, rights-, and religious-based arguments either con-
sciously or unconsciously. Students encounter Kantian ethics in a variety 
of non-economics classes, and they are taught the categorical imperative 
that no person should be used as a means to another's end. Students 
thus justify the Living Wage movement based on a belief in the inherent 
dignity and equality of every person, rather than an analysis of outcomes 
produced by such a policy. Religious rules and duties (such as the Ten 
Commandments) also shape the social landscape and their "rightness" 
is said to derive from divine law. Some students support market inter-
ventions like price controls because of intrinsic religious or other norms 
against price gouging and usury. 
In addition to rules and duties, virtue ethics is an increasingly popular 
moral theory that students will encounter in philosophy and business 
ethics classes. Virtue ethics deals with understanding and shaping the 
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intentions and preferences of the economic agent. Students are thoroughly 
familiar with this approach because proper socialization usually entailed 
parents and other mentors highlighting virtuous conducts and enforcing 
habits they would like their children to internalize. For most economists, 
intentions and preferences are exogenous to our models and not within 
the scope of public policy choices. Yet current policy debates may raise 
notions of personal responsibility, self-control, and civic virtues (for 
example, in welfare reform, in tax compliance, in voting, and ultimatum 
game behaviors). 
Rather than dismissing non-economic perspectives, teachers should 
engage students in critical thinking exercises about non-consequentialist 
ethical approaches. This creates openings for discussion between classes 
in economics and political science, philosophy, religion, and other areas 
where rights, duties, and virtue ethics often dominate the discourse. It is 
also important that faculties in those disciplines abandon the caricature of 
Homo economicus and develop a deeper appreciation for consequentialist 
thinking in economics and the ethical justification for markets that derive 
from it. To promote these ends, I briefly outline in class and in a handout 
the three main ethical approaches (consequences, duties/rules, and virtues). 
I tell students that economics can contribute important insights to the anal-
ysis of consequences, but that some public policy situations may require 
them to analyze and judge alternative ethical frameworks supported with 
relevant arguments. While economists are not experts in moral theory, 
that in itself is an insufficient reason for ignoring the topic. Critical think-
ing would require grappling with alternative ethical frameworks because 
they are ubiquitously intertwined with public policy choices and with the 
lives our students lead outside of economics classes. 
CONCLUSION 
Preparing students for complex decision-making may require reintegrat-
ing a basic understanding of how economists construct measures of 
welfare, how moral agents actually behave in markets, and how science 
relies upon virtuous norms and normative arguments. The Teagle report 
rightly laments the neglect of moral reasoning in economics because its 
absence in the classroom limits critical thinking and ultimately debases the 
liberal arts experience. If economic concepts were successfully integrated 
into a liberal arts setting, students "would not think that the economic way 
of thinking is the only right way of thinking" and they would be knowl-
edgeable about alternative ways of thinking (Colander and McGoldrick, 
Chapter 1, this volume, p. 19). A liberal arts education would reveal the 
58 Educating economists: the Teagle discussion 
economic way of thinking in its historical and ethical context, providing 
linkages to other disciplines. It is always challenging for teachers to take 
on something new, and moral discourse may be a particularly troubling 
add-on for economists. My own experience is that the marginal costs of 
introducing ethics are quite low when normative discourse is addressed 
in small doses over many days (examples can be found in Wight and 
Morton, 2007). Like most teaching, repetition is needed for students to 
develop competency. The marginal benefits of addressing moral inquiry 
are quite large, however, because the study of economics adds more to the 
students' liberal arts experience when its practice is synergistic with, and 
complementary to, other soCial sciences and humanities. 
NOTE 
* Erik Craft, KimMarie McGoldrick, Robert Frank, and Justin Weiss provided valuable 
comments; conclusions remain the author's. This discussion draws on a forthcoming 
essay (Wight, 2009). 
